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The Bodhisattva as Metaphor to 
Jung’s Concept of Self
James D. Thomas
When alone I proceed through myself, I meet him wherever I go. 
He is the same as me, yet I am not he! Liang-chieh1
1 Chang Chung-yuan, Original Teachings of Chan Buddhism (NY, 1969), p. 60.
2 Jung, C. G., Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (NY, 1970), p. 250.
3 Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections (Vintage Books, NY, 1963), p. 208.
4 Jung, Psychology and Alchemy, Bollingen Series XII (Princeton, 1968), p. 20.
Bollingen Series referred to hereafter as CW (Collected Works).
This ‘something’ is strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and 
yet unknowable.... C. G. Jung2
It was in 1929, while in collaboration with Richard Wilhelm on The 
Secret of the Golden Flower, that Carl Jung wrote: “I reached the central 
point in my thinking and in my researches, namely, the concept of the 
self... ,”3 Despite the wide range of subjects for his curiosity and pro­
digious research, there is little doubt that Jung’s consummate interest was 
in unfolding the mysteries of the self.
In searching for a term that expressed the center of his explorations, 
Jung was extremely cautious. He settled on
... the psychological name of the ‘self’... a term on the one hand 
definite enough to express the indescribable and indeterminable 
nature of this wholeness. The paradoxical qualities of the term are in 
keeping with the fact that wholeness consists partly of the conscious 
man and partly of the unconscious man.4 *
Jung’s caution at this point reveals his attraction to and fear of philosophic 
abstractions. Jung saw himself as an empiricist and pointed with mock 
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pride to “an unimpeachable source” the British Medical Journal, pro­
claiming him “an empiricist first and last.”5 The problem is that neither 
Jung’s eclecticism nor his subject matter will allow for strict empirical 
description. With both philosophical and psychological consistency one 
can point to the ego as the conscious aspect of self, but what can be rea­
sonably stated about the self’s involvement in the unconscious?
5 Jung, Answer to Buber (NY, 1957), p. 3.
4cwxn,p. 21.
’ Ibid., par. 44.
8 Psychology and Religion, CW XI, par. 956.
9 Two Essays, CW, Vol. VII, par. 201.
Jung declares that “the self is absolutely paradoxical in that it re­
presents in every respect thesis, antithesis and at the same time synthesis.”6 
Given the style of Jung and the nature of his subject, ambiguities are 
unavoidable. Jung struggles with definitions empirical through paradoxical 
to enigmatic when he describes the self as . not only the center but 
the whole circumference.”7 At every stage, it is as though he is warning 
that a figure can only carry the idea of self so far before it tends to obscure 
and/or limit it. After his travels in India, Jung wrote:
Though very well acquainted with the self’s peculiar and paradoxical 
phenomenology, we remain conscious of the fact that we are discern­
ing, with the limited means at our disposal, something essentially 
unknown and expressing it in terms of psychic structures which may 
not be adequate to the nature of what is to be known.8
Jung constantly sought figures, analogues and metaphors that were 
dynamic and specific enough without making pretensions to conceptual 
closure. Clearly, Jung was caught up in the tension between philosophy 
and symbolic expression. It was for Jung a creative tension, for he al­
ternately used the one to extend and illuminate the other. Jung points up 
this creative impasse by writing that
... a psychology that satisfies the intellect alone can never be prac­
tical, for the totality of the psyche can never be grasped by intellect 
alone. Whether we will or no, philosophy keeps breaking through, 
because the psyche seeks an expression that will embrace its total 
nature.9
Philosophy keeps breaking through as the necessary result of mean­
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ing; and meaning is the necessary result of observation of phenomena. 
The trouble is, that philosophy, poorly engaged, can reduce a living subject 
matter to a sterile “nothing but” formula. Properly used, philosophy can 
illuminate without unduly restricting its subject. One of the most useful 
of philosophic tools in this regard is metaphor. The genius of the metaphor 
is its broader perspective beyond the restrictive confines of the literal. 
Its special hazard is its style of being purposefully nonspecific and sugges­
tive of not only the unknown but the unknowable. The latter suggestion 
is, of course, a great threat to rationalism and scientific method, which 
explains in part the understandable suspicion that surrounds the use of 
metaphor.
James Onley explores metaphor in larger context as he suggests that 
those Socratic and Einsteinian world pictures, models, hypotheses, myths 
and cosmologies are better called metaphors.
Metaphor in this sense is a classical and essential way of knowing. We 
can say “this is like that” forever but it is the metaphor that gives an overall 
pattern of meaning to the connections. It acts as a man-made bridge 
between subjective consciousness and the objective world.
A metaphor, then, through which we stamp our own image on the 
face of nature, allows us to connect the known of ourselves to the 
unknown of the world, and, making available new rational patterns, 
it simultaneously organizes the self into a new and richer entity; so 
that the old known self is joined to and transformed into the new, the 
heretofore unknown, self. Metaphor says very little about what 
the world is, or is like, but a great deal about what I am, or am like, 
and about what I am becoming; and in the end it connects me more 
nearly with the deep reaches of myself than with any objective 
universe.10
10 Onley, James, Metaphors of Self (Princeton, 1972), pp. 31-32.
Metaphor has none of the features of an austere and parsimonious 
system that addresses itself to facts and objective reality. Metaphor is 
often rather flamboyant and even reckless in its expression. Donald 
Rhoades writes:
We say that tables have ‘legs’, needles and hurricanes have ‘eyes’, 
machines have ‘arms’ and ‘fingers’, and all sorts of things have
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‘mouths’.... The religious man, the philosopher, and the scientist— 
and the man on the street—differ only in that their morphisms are 
different; no one is without them.11
11 Rhoades, Donald H., A Faith of Fellowship (Philadelphia, n.d.), p. 82.
12 Onley, p. 34.
13 Ibid, p. 267.
Metaphor is a highly personal and suggestive way of knowing. Its 
peculiar advantage, where honestly used, is to encourage introspection 
of the person using it. For metaphor seems irretrievably intertwined 
with the projection and the acceptance of projection of self. This is so 
no matter what the object of metaphor might be.
When it comes to the self as the conceptual object of attention, Onley 
believes that it is only adequately carried by metaphor since the self is 
already at work seeking to express itself through metaphor. It is far wiser 
to identify this function and ally with it in extension of understanding.
The self expresses itself by the metaphors it creates and projects, 
and we know it by those metaphors; but it did not exist as it now 
does and as it now is before creating its metaphors. We do not see or 
touch the self, but we do see and touch its metaphors; and thus we 
‘know’ the self, activity as agent, represented in the metaphor and the 
metaphorizing.12
Even more necessary is the use of metaphor when attempting to express 
one’s own sense of self:
One cannot... hope to capture with a straight on look, or expect to 
transmit directly to another, one’s own sense of self; at most one 
may be able to discover a similitude, a metaphor, for the feeling of 
selfhood.13
The concept of self as well as the personal sense of self has the quality 
of myth about it. It resists being either something concrete or a hypothe­
tical reference. Any attempt to define or explain the self in terms that 
exclude the function of myth and metaphor tends to reify it.
Certainly Jung was no stranger to metaphor. Seeking means to develop 
a theory of self, he used the mandala as a metaphor. The mandala, a 
magic circle encompassing a square, suggests that the self is at once a 
center, a goal, a totality, an inner tension and a union of opposites. The 
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mandala as metaphor has several advantages. It is sufficiently removed 
from our Western scientific attitude to give fresh perspective; it is also 
visually crisp and geometrically pleasing, however it is cold and imper­
sonal.
Further, Jung struggled to portray the self in its uniquely human and 
yet godlike potential. He writes of the Original Man, the Anthropos, the 
androgynous Adam, “... of that more universal, truer, more eternal 
man dwelling in the darkness of the primordial night. There he is still the 
whole, and the whole is in him, indistinguishable from nature and bare of 
all egohood.”14 What figure is adequate to this task? Explaining the 
difficulty in writing an autobiography, Jung writes:
»♦ Civilization in Transition, CW, Vol. X, par. 304.
15 Memories, Dreams and Reflections (NY, 1963), p. 4.
Man cannot compare himself with any other creature; he is not a 
monkey, not a cow, not a tree. I am a man. But what is it to be that? 
Like every other being, I am a splinter of the infinite deity, but I 
cannot contrast myself with any animal, any plant, any stone. Only 
a mythical being has any range greater than man’s. How then can a 
man have any definite opinion about himself.15
Jung, still seeking a fuller model to carry his insights into self, drew 
upon the figure of Christ. The self expresses itself through the conscious 
ego in just such a way as God seeks to become flesh through Christ. The 
figure is almost too powerful. For the implications for theology are 
considerable. Even while Jung insisted that he was not writing theology, 
he was calling for men to be responsible by withdrawing their projections 
from the historical Jesus and looking to their own Christ/self within. 
This may well be metaphor working overtime. To say that the intrapsychic 
self is like an extrapsychic phenomena is valid, but to use that metaphor 
as persuasion concerning the outer reality is questionable. There is no 
evidence that this was Jung’s intention. But the hazard is there even though 
one can understand why the metaphor was so attractive. Jung was reared 
in a Christian atmosphere and many of his family were theologians. The 
figure was just too close. It was bound to be as confusing to some as it 
was revealing to others.
Since the concept of self has peculiar emotive connotations and power­
ful subjective implications, there is advantage in choosing a model that is
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culturally and/or historically removed. One could argue that Christ would 
be a better model of self for the Westerner. However, it seems to me that 
this threatens more conflict than it promises benefit as a heuristic device. 
Jung, in speaking of the Christian’s relation to Christ and the Buddhist’s 
identification with Buddha, writes this:
Fundamentally these confessions are identical, inasmuch as the 
Buddhist only attains this knowledge when he is without self, “anat- 
man.” But there exists an immense difference between the two 
formulations. The Christian attains his end in Christ, the Buddhist re­
cognizes that he is Buddha. The Christian, starting from the transi­
tory and egocentric world of his consciousness, dissolves in Christ, 
but the Buddhist still rests on the eternal foundations of inner nature, 
whose at-one-ness with the divinity as with the universal Being, we 
meet in the other Indian confessions as well.16
16 On the Psychology of Eastern Meditation (NY, 1949), p. 18.
For the Westerner, there seems to be an unavoidable conflict here. Does 
one partake of (take part in) the object of identification or does one aim 
at becoming that object? To the extent that the object (Christ) is also God, 
grave theological problems arise for the orthodox Christian. Buddhist 
doctrine presents no such problem. If it cannot be said that the Buddha 
was deified, it must be recognized that his image has tended to be elevated 
to a superhuman level.
To the extent that this is so, the bodhisattva figure presents itself as a 
more accessible model. To be sure, the bodhisattva himself was deified. 
But the bodhisattva has stubborn roots in the merely human and is as 
much a process as a condition. The very name denotes an exalted state 
in the making. It combines the very human with a spiritual potentiality. 
Every human being is a potential bodhisattva. But since the bodhisattva 
figure itself is controversial, let us speak more precisely to the concept.
The conception of the bodhisattva emerged concurrent with the de­
velopment of Mahayana Buddhism. In the fourth century bc an ideo­
logical split began to appear in Buddhism that was to widen into two 
distinct forms known as Theravada (Way of the Elders) and Mahayana 
(Great Vehicle, Great Ferryboat). By the first century ad the doctrinal 
differences were clearly drawn and visible in the sutras (scriptures). In 
the early Mahayana sutras the term “bodhisattva” (bodhi: enlightenment 
33
THOMAS
and sattva: being) came to mean a “Buddha-designate.” Although de­
finitions vary, the central distinction to be made is between a Buddha-being 
(having arrived in nirvana) and a Buddha-designate (being on the way but 
short of nirvana). The bodhisattva is distinguished by his conscious post­
ponement of nirvana because of his identification with and compassion 
for all living things.
One of the central conditions that give rise to the bodhisattva figure 
was the growing elitism of the Buddhist priesthood. It was charged that 
the priests, called Arahats and Paccekabuddhas (private Buddhas), were 
interested only in their own complete nirvana. They were interested neither 
in teaching nor service and neglected to emulate the compassionate feature 
of the Buddha. Early Buddhist doctrine did emphasize that each life was 
a separate entity and completely responsible for its own spiritual condition. 
This concept was implemented by Jain doctrine to severe and austere 
extremes. As such, it had less and less appeal to the masses.
The figure of the Buddha had undergone idealization and spiritualiza­
tion to such an extent as to make him inaccessible to the common man. 
Hinduism in the second century bc underwent a great revival which 
must have posed a threat to Buddhism. There was a great upheaval of 
Bhakti (devotion, worship, love) as the religious means of expression. 
Buddhism had developed in such a way as to appeal very little to the 
masses. It had become a metaphysical doctrine or an esoteric psychology 
with nothing that could appeal as an object of devotion.
Mahayana Buddhism emerged as an answer to these conditions. In­
digenous in Buddhist doctrine and alongside the principle of individual 
accountability is the concept of the interdependence of all things. This 
tenet gave Mahayanists their answer to extreme individualism and became 
a logical basis for the doctrine of “vicarious merit.” It follows that if all 
beings are interdependent then the dharma (merit) of one may be devoted 
to the good of others.
Complementing this doctrine in its appeal to the imagination of the 
common man was Mahayana’s re-emphasis that the Buddha-being resides 
potentially in every person and thing. These two principles tended to 
bring Buddhism closer to the people. Not only do good intention and 
acts of devotion make a difference but the benefits of grace are accessible 
to everyone.
The central carrier of these Mahayana doctrines is the bodhisattva. 
He (or she) is designated for Buddhahood but remains human and in the 
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factual here-and-now. In fact, because of his wisdom and compassion 
he identifies with all ignorant and struggling creatures so completely 
that his own nirvana is postponed. He is the worthy object of adoration, 
for his endless compassion overflows with grace on all who come near 
him. At the same time he embodies the gospel that the Buddha-being 
potential resides in everyone.
Bodhisattvas appear in the literature expressing themselves in a wide 
range of characteristics—from deified saviors to “household” bodhisat­
tvas. Richard Robinson, in dealing with the term “householder” bodhi­
sattva observes that “... no sutra preaches devotion to a celestrial 
bodhisattva until the third century ad, a full three centuries after these 
beings entered the literature.”17
17 Robinson, Richard H., The Buddhist Religion (Belmont, 1970), p. 54.
*■ Ibid., p. 55.
Mahayana Buddhism taught that every man and woman—every crea­
ture—can and must eventually become a bodhisattva. This being so, at 
what point does a mere human being become a bodhisattva? There seem 
to be both conservative and liberal answers to this question.
The Mahayana sutras address themselves to monastics and laity alike 
and although they are written by monks alone some are quite liberal in 
their inclusion of the laity. Robinson draws from the Vimalaklrti Sutra a 
view of
... the householder bodhisattva encouraging a crowd of young 
patricians to leave the household life. When they protest that they 
cannot do so without their parents’ permission, Vimalaklrti tells 
them to arouse the thought of enlightenment and practice diligently, 
since that is the equivalent to ‘going forth.’... The householder 
bodhisattva was welcome to study meditation and philosophy, 
and probably was allowed to spend protracted periods of retreat in 
the monasteries, He could teach the doctrine and was encouraged 
to propagate it.18
These household bodhisattvas are too numerous to mention. Only 
the exceptional ones will have been lionized. The bodhisattva image is 
then both a goal to be attained and a way of achieving it. Even the celestial 
bodhisattvas are pictured constantly working at the same menial tasks 
that engage ordinary human beings. Lord Avalokita, who is portrayed as 
a god, has a double meaning in his name.
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Evans-Wentz translates Avalokiteivara as both “The Lord looking 
down in pity” and “The Lord seen within.”19 No matter how engran- 
dized the bodhisattva figure becomes, the subjective implications are 
still there. “We are all reflections of the image of the bodhisattva. The 
sufferer within us is that divine being. We and that protecting father are 
one.”20
19 Evans-Wentz, W. Y., Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrine (Oxford London, 1935), 
p. 233, n. 2.
20 Campbell, Joseph, The Hero with a Thousand Faces (NY, 1967), p. 161.
31 Hutchison, John A., Paths of Faith (NY, 1969), p. 155.
The bodhisattva image originally emerged as an answer to the elitism 
of monastics and the inaccessibility of religious expression for the common 
people. The bodhisattva was a living model for the doctrine of inner po­
tential and perfectability of all creatures—at once a superdemocratic and 
an aristocratic ideal. The bodhisattva was also carrier/model for yet 
another and complementary doctrine—that of the ideal being in the here 
and now. The bodhisattva in Mahayana Buddhism points toward nirvana 
that is not annihilation or the loss of this world but rather is attainment 
of full potentiality. To suppose that nirvana requires the end of discrim­
ination and the loss of this world is completely in error. This teaching 
as a philosophic principle goes all the way back to Nagarjuna (c. ad 200) 
who takes the Buddha's doctrines of anatta (not-self) and anicca (imper­
manence) to a radical extreme. Not only is there no substantial self and 
no permanence in reality, there is no Buddhahood and no nirvana. Real­
ity for Nagarjuna is emptiness.
To apprehend this emptiness, or void, one must have the correct 
viewpoint. One may see things either (1) under the aspect of eternity 
(paramartha satya) or (2) from the viewpoint of human finitude 
(sarjtvfiti satya). From the viewpoint of finite, mortal apprehension, 
the delusion of substantive existence to concede apparent or empirical 
existence of the world around him, and at the same time maintain that 
from the viewpoint of eternity all this was delusory and unreal.... 
Nagarjuna’s argument might be paraphrased as the assertion of a kind 
of universal relativity. All things possess only relative being; nothing 
really or ultimately exists.21
The immediate implication of this position is that the world of rela­
tivity and that of nirvana are one and only seem to differ by virtue of being 
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seen from different points of view. D. T. Suzuki, in his study of the 
Lankavatara Sutra, insists that identity between nirvana and samsara is 
fundamental to Mahayana Buddhism.
So long as dualism is adhered to, there is no Nirvana, no self-realiza­
tion. Light and shadow, long and short, black and white—they 
are mutually related; when they stand alone each by itself, they have 
no meaning. So with Nirvana. When it is sought after in relation to 
Samsara, we have a sort of Nirvana. But this kind vanishes when se­
parated from the condition of mutuality in which it exists. True Nir­
vana is that which is realized in the oneness of Nirvana and Samsara, 
absolute or sflnya in its nature and above the relativity of etemalism 
and nihilism. Mahayana followers strive to realize this kind of 
Nirvana.22
22 Suzuki, D. T., Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra (London, 1930), p. 129.
23 Goddard, D. A., A Buddhist Bible (NY, 1938), p. 352.
24 Chang, pp. 98-99.
The aim of this doctrine is to countermand the other-worldly tenden­
cies of Buddhism. The message is that reality is one; that it is now; and 
that it is universally common property for those who are willing to accept 
it.
This world is the Buddha-world
Within which enlightenment may be sought. 
To seek enlightenment by separating from this world 
Is as foolish as to search for a rabbit’s horn.23
The bodhisattva, then, in this branch of Buddhism, becomes a very 
human hero. The Chinese Buddhist Master Fen-yang (947-1024) is 
speaking about MafljuSri, a bodhisattva who is often grandly deified:
There are some Buddhist learners who have already made the mistake 
of seeking for Mafiju£ri at Mount Wu-t*ai. There is no Mafiju^ri 
at Wu-t*ai. Do you want to know MafijuSri? It is something at this 
moment working within you, something which remains unshakable 
and allows no room for doubt. This is called the living Mafiju^ri.24
In this view, the bodhisattva is not a god with superhuman compassion 
as his only motivation. Compassion is there, of course, but it does not 
solely explain his reason for not crossing over. He feels deeply for all 
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suffering beings. His heart is “full of karuna (love) for all beings who 
are unable to step out of the dualistic whirlpools of sat and asat.... His 
own heart is free from such attachments as are ordinarily cherished by 
the unemancipated, but that which feels persists.”25 “That which feels” 
is that aspect of him that continues to belong to that which is human. He 
identifies himself (including his own nirvana) with all other creatures and 
sees himself (including his own ignorance) as inseparably interinvolved.
25 Suzuki, p. 221.
26 Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India (NY, 1942), p. 493.
27 Suzuki, pp. 219-220.
Lin Yutang writes: “The word bodhisattva, the most important doc­
trine of Mahayana religion, is such a common Chinese word that we use 
it in speaking of sweet child (like the word ‘cherub’) and of clay doll.”26 
This common applicability of the term seems to me to be further evidence 
of its egalitarian application and of its movement from metaphor to model 
for ideal self.
What is the nature of this stopping or pausing just short of the goal? 
It is not a position of absolute detachment and is in no way monastic. The 
bodhisattva is fully in the world. He may have a wife, children and pos­
sessions. He may even be in a position of power and authority. What is 
the explanation for this double position of both in and out of the world ? It 
can be understood as the act of a superhero whose compassion for all 
creatures is almost beyond belief. Or, as Suzuki understands it, the bo­
dhisattva is not acting altogether altruistically.27 In fact, he is something 
of a hedonist, in the best sense. He is motivated by a special understand­
ing of the way things are. Simply put, his pleasure depends on the pleasure 
of all: his attainment of nirvana depends on its attainment by all.
To what extent can this “stopping short” be compared to the prayer 
of young Augustine: “Lord, give me chastity, but not yet?” Certainly 
the theology of his time required that an either/or choice and sacrifice 
must be made. The prayer seems to be motivated by carnal or egocentric 
need. He wanted to put off a higher goal and task that was for the moment 
too difficult. There is no indication in Augustine of an attempt to accommo­
date both spheres—the spiritual and the carnal. He was simply putting off 
a difficult calling.
The reverse is true of the bodhisattva. Early Buddhism was clear in 
its teachings of samsara (cycle of rebirth, repeating an experience of life 
and death) as painful. One should seek to get out of it as soon as pos­
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sible. For an early Buddhist, nirvana is the ultimate cessation of this misery 
and to postpone it is the ultimate folly. But the bodhisattva does postpone 
it, not for a while, but virtually forever—until all creatures are in nirvana. 
If one considers nirvana as a place to be in the future, then this act of 
putting off by the bodhisattva can only be understood as that of a martyr­
savior.
If, however, nirvana is understood as a “state of mind,” “an under­
standing,” “a special attitude,” then the picture is quite different.
But as for the Bodhisattva he never enters into Nirvana as he has a 
deep insight into the nature of things which are already in Nirvana 
even as they are.... They (Bodhisattvas) are already in Nirvana 
because their views are not at all beclouded by discrimination. To 
them no discrimination takes place as to things seized and seizing.28
28 Ibid., p. 221.
29 Ibid., p. 229.
In one sense the bodhisattva’s position must be considered as “stop­
ping short” but to the degree that he is enlightened, he realizes that there 
is nothing short of which he has stopped.
In our attempt to understand the motivation of the bodhisattva, the 
pivotal issue is the relationship between prajna (special knowledge) and 
karuna (compassion). Is it pure compassion that makes him “pause” 
and wait forever for all suffering creatures? Or is his “pausing” a rea­
sonable response to a special insight he has concerning the nature of all 
things? Most scholars insist that it is both principles operating in unison.
Mahayana stands firmly on two legs, Prajna and Karuna, tran­
scendental idealism and all-embracing affection for all kinds of 
beings, animate as well as inanimate. The former sees into the unity of 
things and the latter appreciates their diversity. The Bodhisattva 
weeps with suffering beings and at the same time realizes that there 
is one that never weeps, being above sufferings, tribulations and conta­
minations. Buddhist life finds its perfect realization in a harmonious 
blending of the two conceptions: philosophically, the one and the 
many, sat and asat; religiously, the pure and the defiled.29
Jung was attracted to the human aspect of Buddhism. He wrote that 
the “Buddha is the more complete human being. He is a historical per­
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sonality, and therefore easier for men to understand. Christ is at once 
a historical man and God and therefore more difficult to comprehend.**30 
The model for self that Jung sought was not of a purely idealistic nature. 
In his writing, “The Holy Men of India,” he expresses his disdain for and 
suspicion of the purely wise and holy man.
30 Memories, Dreams and Reflections, p. 279.
31 Psychology and Religion, CM, Vol. XI, par. 953.
32 Ibid., par. 953.
33 Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Third Series (London, 1934), p. 65.
The man who is only wise and only holy interests me about as much 
as a skeleton of a rare saurian, which would not move me to tears. The 
insane contradiction, on the other hand, between existence beyond 
Maya in the cosmic Self, and that amiable human weakness which 
fruitfully sinks many roots into the black earth, repeating for all 
eternity the weaving and rending of the veil as the ageless melody of 
India—this contradiction fascinates me; for how else can one per­
ceive the light without the shadow, hear the silence without the 
noise; attain wisdom without foolishness.31
The man that fascinated Jung “... has found meaning in the rushing 
phantasmagoria of Being, freedom in bondage, victory in defeat.”32
It seems to me that the figure that Jung seeks is the bodhisattva— 
that miraculous figure whose only miracle is the full realization of his 
human potential. D.T. Suzuki writes of that full potential.
Thou art it.... All the Bodhisattvas including the Buddha are 
ourselves and their doings are our doings, They looked so full of 
mystery, they were miracles, as long as they were observed from this 
earthly end, where we imagined that there was really something at the 
other end; but as soon as the dividing-wall constructed by our 
imagination is removed, Samantabhadra’s arms raised to save sentient 
beings become our own, which are now engaged in passing the salt to 
a friend at the table, and Maitreya’s opening to the Vairocana 
Tower for Sudhana is our ushering a caller into the parlour for a 
friendly chat.... This again reminds us of P’ang’s reputed verse—
How wondrously supernatural!
And how miraculous this! 
I draw water, I carry fuel!33
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Jung writes in Suzuki's Introduction to Zen Buddhism, “Like the Ego 
is a certain experience of Myself, so is the self an experience of my ego 
which however is no longer experienced in the form of a wider or higher 
ego, but in the shape of a Non-Ego.”34 35This is exactly the point of “no­
mind” or “the man of no title” and the goal of the bodhisattva.
34 Jung, in D. T. Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (Rider, NY), p. 13.
35 Nietzsche, Friedrich, Thus Spake Zarathustra (Chicago, 1957), p. 6.
The bodhisattva stands clearly for self as that borderline entity; bor­
derline in the sense of being both of this world and out of it—possessing 
consciousness but also somehow being in alliance with the unconscious 
domain. Jung thoroughly studied Nietzsche's Zarathustra figure. One 
aspect of Zarathustra pictures the stance of the bodhisattva.
Zarathustra looked at the people and wondered. Then he said: 
“Man is a rope, stretched between beast and Ubermensche—a rope 
across an abyss. A dangerous crossing over, a dangerous on-the-way, 
a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and stopping.33
This is the particular moment I wish to examine: the bodhisattva/self 
in its reflexive position—pausing, looking back, just prior to crossing over. 
It is dangerous to the self/bodhisattva because so much is invested here; 
because looking back runs the risk of losing the goal; because of the 
delicate distinction between self and loss of self; or because of the dis­
tinction between self and ego. Zarathustra is certainly a dangerous pro­
jection of this figure. The bodhisattva and the self seem forever to be on 
the edge of the much promised and sought after wholeness (nirvana). 
Looking back is a risk. Paradoxically, looking back is necessary to 
wholeness. Kwan-yin (a Chinese female bodhisattva) is often pictured 
as suspended between heaven and earth; between Kwan-yin and earth is a 
zygote—an unborn baby in embryo. The self seems forever so suspended.
In myth and legend, the hero often finds himself in a borderline sit­
uation—on a frontier. It is in this position that he acts, and strangely 
enough, he acts not only in response to his own condition but seems to 
suggest that his action is a model for everyone. Erik Erikson considers 
this aspect of the hero in one of the last crisis stages in development 
toward maturation.
In his epilogue to Young Man Luther, he suggests that the hero inter­
nalizes the problems of his age and deals with them intimately as though 
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they were private life or death issues. Surprisingly, this private struggle 
can become the model of behavior or answer to the problems of an age. 
He writes of this period as an
... integrity crisis which again leads men to the portals of nothing­
ness ... and that for him all human integrity stands or falls with 
the one style of integrity of which he partakes.... He acts as if 
mankind were starting all over again with his own beginning as an 
individual, conscious of his singularity as well as his humanity.... 
To him history ends as well as starts with him.36
36 Erikson, Erik H., Young Mm Luther (NY, 1962), pp. 260-262.
This is exactly the stance of the bodhisattva and is exactly that stance 
to which the self is drawn.
It was surely by design that Jung left the great bulk and the heart of 
his work virtually inaccessible to conceptual systematization. If anything 
he took the term ‘self’ out beyond the reach of conceptualization and its 
tendency to reduction and reification. But at the same time, he was ener­
getically involved in enlarging the working edges of the self as concept. 
I believe that certain specific generalizations which characterize the self 
emerge in Jung’s writings. These characteristics can be best portrayed 
as operating as an open system. I propose that the self, as Jung defines 
it can be regarded as:
1. Superordinate system
2. Goal
3. Center of opposites
4. Uniting symbol
5. Agent
6. Archetypal expression
The self is simultaneously all of these aspects. Each aspect is dependent 
on the others within the superordinate system and there is overlap be­
tween the various features or aspects of the self. I am dealing with self 
in the context of health and the self as definitive of health. Jung was a psy­
chiatrist and he dealt with the pathology of self. He also fashioned a psy­
chological theory that gives perspective into the creative function of self. 
The latter is my concern. The self can be viewed as either process or 
structure. It is a matter of perspective and surely one implies the other. 
For the moment, however, I am emphasizing the structural features but I 
insist (with the model of open system) that it is impossible to think of this 
as structure without process. I am suggesting that Jung’s concept of self 
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can be viewed as an open system and can be regarded as having these 
six discernible aspects.
Further, I propose that the bodhisattva is an adequate and stimulating 
metaphor to this conceptual model. This metaphor is admittedly a bridge 
built from the Western conceptual end. Even so, it must be recognized 
that the foundations of the bodhisattva are ideally rooted in ideology and 
history at the other end. This is as much as we could hope for in a bridge 
between the cognitive and intuitive approaches. Without going into exten­
sive detail, I will summarize the nature of these six aspects and then em­
ploy the bodhisattva figure as metaphor to illuminate Jung’s picture of 
self.
Self as Goal
Jung points out that the self is not a given condition along with the 
state of consciousness. Rather, it is latent in the unconsciousness and 
must be sought after and worked at as a goal. The discipline of this task 
is called “individuation” and requires of an individual that he disown all 
that is not natural to him. He must resist being collectivized by the co­
ercive dictates of the primordial unconscous and being deracinated by 
the arrogance of the conscious ego. This prize of self is not a singular 
end product. Rather, it involves a never ending series of maturational 
stages. For Jung, self is an ideal potential, characterized by the quality 
of wholeness, toward which one aspires forever.
The language of both Jung and Buddhism is a study in elaborate avoid­
ance of metaphysics. The language of both strives to be purely empirical. 
They are making an effort simply to report certain psychological features 
they have explored and developed. The central purpose of this great 
effort in both sources is to avoid the philosophic and experiential hazards 
around the issue of the substantiality of the self.
Eliot Deutsch suggests that the theory of nonreality of the “substantial” 
self, so prominent in Buddhist teaching must be understood in both historic 
and psychological context. “The assertion that the empirical self is an 
ever changing, unstable pattern of feeling, thought, etc., does not con­
tradict the Upanishadic view; it represents only a different emphasis.”37
87 Deutsch, Eliot, Humanity and Divinity (Honolulu, 1970), p. 116.
Both Jung and Buddhism insist that, as an object, self is a hazard, and 
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that selfhood is a heuristic abstraction. The self, in this sense, is not 
something that is owned as an exclusive entity. The Buddhist sutras con­
tinually deny the existence of self in this sense. But the goal of Buddhism, 
nirvana, is seriously misunderstood in the West as simply the peaceful 
loss of all identity.
The bodhisattva figure, as an ideal expression of maturation, is a direct 
contradiction of this misinterpretation. The vows made and disciplines 
entered into represent a regimen of heroic effort to achieve some goal. 
The career of the bodhisattva is divided into stages or epochs, called 
bhumi.38 The word denotes ‘earth’, ‘place’ or ‘region’ and has a connota­
tion of ‘stage’, ‘level’ or ‘state of consciousness*. The bhumi can be con­
sidered stages of sequential maturation and are descriptive of the levels of 
achievement. Bodhisattvahood itself is described as the ideal goal of whole­
ness, completion of potentiality, at-one-ment. Nothing is lost in the 
tragic sense—all is gained. This is exactly Jung’s description of self as goal.
33 Extensively detailed in Suzuki, Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, pp. 222 et pas­
sim.
39 Two Essays, CW, Vol. VII, par. 282.
40 Conze, Edward, Buddhism: Its Essence and Development (NY, 1951), p. 30.
Self as Center of Opposites
Jung pictured the self as a borderline condition. Self, in this sense, 
can only be considered in its functional role. He speaks of it as that 
.. desired midpoint of the personality, that ineffable something be­
twixt the opposites.”39
The self as a center of opposites takes on a spatial feature which ex­
presses itself as a bridge, borderline, condition-in-between or midwife. 
The solitary “I” of the self finds itself alone and in between all conscious 
distinctions. The “I” becomes conscious of its interstitial posture with the 
recognition of inside/outside, self/not-self, male/female, yin/yang, etc.
The creative role of self in this position is arbitration. The intransigent 
ego and the overwhelming unconscious domain struggle for dominant 
expression. The self, at its creative best, acts as midwife. This condition 
of in-between is captured in the image of the bodhisattva—both in his 
task and in his position. “A Bodhisattva is a being compounded of the two 
contradictory forces of wisdom and compassion. In his wisdom, he sees 
no persons; in his compassion, he is resolved to save them.”40
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That he maintains in this position and acts out of it is the very mark 
of his creativity. He remains at the point of tension with respect to moti­
vation. Does he act out of compassion or out of hedonism? Such questions 
are not solved once and for all but are suffered or confronted experientially 
at each volitional juncture. His very position just short of nirvana is one 
of ambiguous tension. Such is the abode of self as experienced. Its place 
is in the midst of an eternal becoming; in transit between the unconscious 
sphere and consciousness; in tension between the “I” and “not-I.” This 
is the condition of both self and bodhisattva.
Self as Uniting Symbol
From an altogether different perspective and in a different expression 
of itself, the self is not only that point of tension between opposites but it is 
also the symbol for the resolution of those opposites. Jung speaks of that 
position of creative tension as the “transcendent function.”
The shuttling to and fro of arguments and affects represents the 
transcendent function of opposites. The confrontation of the two 
positions generates a tension charged with energy and creates a living 
third thing ... a movement out of the suspension between opposites, 
a living birth that leads to a new level of being, a new situation.41
41 Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, CW, Vol. VM, p. 90.
42 Psychological Types, CW, Vol. VI, p. 460.
This living third thing is the self as it presents itself in myth and dreams 
as the symbol for wholeness. Jung reports from his analytic inquiry that 
the self seems to “present” itself in dream content as a ‘goal-seeking* 
figure. It appears in forms, ranging from obvious hero figures to obscure 
mandalas. The central characteristic of this presentation is that it points 
toward wholeness in the form of a totality symbol. Empirically, the self 
seems to consistently present itself as a union of opposites, “... it can also 
appear as a united duality, in the form, for instance, of too as the inter­
play of yang and yin.”42
Jung found that when the conscious ego treated the self as a Thou (in 
Buber’s sense—a uniting symbol), it (the ego) is caught up in the symbol, 
transformed and enhanced by it. The bodhisattva is a uniting symbol 
par excellence. He not only stands between all opposites, he stands for the 
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union of those opposites. He does not avoid death or rebirth—rather he 
exemplifies the continuing resolution of both. So it is with nirvana/ 
samsara, truth/illusoriness, enlightenment/compassion, maleness/female- 
ness, the jewel/the lotus, yang/yin, the bodhisattva stands as the mys- 
terium coniunctionis.
Speaking of monks who seek the bodhisattva Manju^ri in exalted 
places, Suzuki writes:
Do you wish to know where he is? There is something this very 
moment at work in you, showing no tendency to waver, betraying 
no disposition to doubt—this is your living MafijuSri. The light of 
non-discrimination which flashes through every thought of yours— 
this is your Samantabhadra who remains true all the time.43
43 Suzuki, pp. 65-66.
Self as Agent
The self as agent is a crucial issue of our picture. The self must be 
something more than object (that which is acted upon); it must also be 
subject. The problem is to find its place between the hazards of servility 
and hubris. If the ego is the sole agent, the result is ego inflation and 
disaster. It is necessary for the ego to take its rightful place in intensive, 
localized consciousness. In this position, it is capable of sensing the 
world and ordering its perceptions into conceptions. It is capable of 
choosing, intending and making concrete the object of its attention. The 
ego can more fully function in this domain, if it realizes its proper rela­
tionship to the self that consists also of the unconscious. Here the self 
as agent must shift its weight in between ego and self into a position that 
Erich Neumann calls the ego-self axis. From this position, the self is 
truly agential but not ego-maniacal.
On the crucial issue of the agential role of the self, Jung took great 
pains to differentiate between the ego and the self. The doctrines of 
Buddhism and the disciplines of the bodhisattva likewise put great em­
phasis on the false claims of the ego. The insight of both Jung and Bud­
dhism is that the self is not the ego but is rooted in the totality of the 
universe and yet somehow expressed in its particularity as “suchness.”
Jung sees the universal aspect of self as rooted in the unconscious; for 
the Buddhist, it is rooted in the Buddha-being. For the individual to ignore 
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his roots in the universal principle is the ultimate in folly. The individual 
must find his sense of self both in the conscious and the unconscious 
domains—in sat (existence) and asat (nonexistence). It is also the task 
of the individual to accept the responsibility of consciousness.
Jung points out that the self must accept its full responsibility in the 
domain of consciousness, volition and sensation. Certainly, this is not 
the totality of self but it is an important feature. The bodhisattva takes 
his first step by “arousing the thought.” The bodhicitta is a truth that 
can be known and he sets out to know and act upon it. “The Bodhisattva 
would be a man who does not only set himself free but who is skillful in 
devising means for bringing out and maturing the latent seeds of enlight­
enment in others.”*4
Because the supreme test of the bodhisattva is his eternal readiness 
to serve, he must discipline himself in the nonexperience of ego. This 
task is assisted by his contemplation of the principles of the interpenetra­
tion of all things, or the principle of “form is emptiness and emptiness, 
form.” The final goal is knowledge or wisdom but the means indicated is 
action. Ego-clogged acts tend to enslave.
... but the candidate for the Wisdom of the Other Shore behaves 
consistently as though he had already left behind the delusion of 
the world display. In every act of his daily living he makes a decision in 
favor of the self-transcending alternative, until at last, as a con­
sequence of infinitely numerous deed-experiences of this kind, he 
does actually transcend the delusions of his phenomenal psychology: 
thenceforward he behaves instinctively as though his ego, with 
its false impressions, did not exist.44 5
44 Conze, p. 128.
45 Zimmer, Heinrich, Philosophies of India (NY, 1951), p. 545.
As a discipline, this could well be adapted to Jung’s prescriptions for 
individuation. The hazards of ego-possession or inflation are vividly il­
lustrated in case studies. However, it must be noted that the Buddhist 
doctrine goes a step beyond that of Jung. Whereas Buddhism would com­
pletely dissolve the ego, Jung would shift the sense of self apart from, but 
inclusive of the ego. To the extent that the bodhisattva remains forever 
in existence with the accompanying implications of involvement with ego- 
to that extent there is only a difference of degree. To the degree that 
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Buddhism posits the elimination of the ego as an idea, there is a distinct 
difference of opinion. Obviously this is one of the central ideological 
impasses between East and West.
Nevertheless the parallel still holds. The self and the bodhisattva 
exist in a world in which their freedom, choice and action are crucial. 
Zimmer speaks of action in his chapter on “The Way of the Bodhisattva.”
Practice precedes insight; knowledge is the reward of action: there­
fore try! That is the thought. For it is by doing things that one 
becomes transformed.... Knowledge is to be attained ... not 
through inaction (as in the Jaina and the classic Yoga disciplines) 
but through a bold and advertent living of life.46
46 Ibid., p. 544.
47 Suzuki, p. 63.
The Self as Archetype
The self as archetype is too simply worded. Rather, the self seems to 
operate from an archetypal base and present itself as an image which 
seeks fulfillment in consciousness and action. Just as the physical body 
seems to operate out of a genetic design that is discernible by its pattern 
the psyche possesses general and typical modes of functioning. These 
are based in archetypes. They are inherited possibilities which reflect 
backwards to collective experience and point forward to specific potential.
Across the threshold of consciousness come images of saoshyant (the 
recurring one), the hero, the god/man, etc., which bid to be recognized 
and integrated in order to fulfill a potentiality. The conscious ego that 
can entertain such archetypal images of self will tend to be transformed 
by the images. It is as though the unconscious is fecund with the image of 
a potential self. Its prolific expression seeks to be fertilized.
Basic to Buddhism is the concept that Buddha-being lies inherent in 
all things waiting to be fulfilled. In discussing the bodhisattva, Suzuki 
writes: “Owing to its self-expanding and self-creating power, a great 
loving heart transforms this earthly world into one of splendor and mutual 
fusion, and this is where the Buddha is always abiding.”47 And again, 
describing the
... way that the Bodhisattva comes: he comes where an all-embrac­
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ing love abides, because he desires to discipline all beings; he comes 
where there is a great compassionate heart, because he desires to 
protect all beings against sufferings; he comes out of the skilful 
means born of transcendental knowledge because he is ever in 
conformity with the mentalities of all beings.48
* Ibid., p. 120.
49 Jung, Aion, CW, Vol. IX, Part II, p. 204.
30 Chang, p. 201.
Only the word “archetype” is missing from the many descriptions 
of the bodhisattva’s appearance and function. He appears when the occa­
sion is right for him to fulfill himself. He also appears in the form and 
functions in the manner that will fulfill his own nature. Jung speaks of 
the self as an archetype and more specifically as the organizing arche­
type or the archetype of order. In his most comprehensive work on the 
self, he states it is “the real organizing principle of the unconscious.”49
At this point, Jung presents his case in as strongly empirical a way 
as is possible for this subject matter. Out of the thousands of dream 
studies appeared a factor that demanded attention. There appeared in 
these dreams an insistent theme which not only bid for psychic wholeness 
but prescribed the nature of that wholeness. It was as though the self 
itself (with the aid of its unconscious domain) symbolically presents its 
own prescription for wholeness. Jung called this aspect of self the self­
archetype and it seems forever to be working as an organizing principle 
toward its own wholeness. The bodhisattva, in his training, is taught 
that he is no more seeking something than he is being sought after. Chang 
Chung-yuan writes:
Master Po-chang asked a student to poke in a fire pot in search of 
a burning coal. When the student reported that there was none, Po- 
chang poked deep in the fire pot and extracted a small glowing piece 
of charcoal which he showed to the student saying, “Is this not a 
burning piece?. ..The Sutra says, ‘To behold the Buddha-nature 
one must wait for the right moment and the right conditions.* When 
the time comes, one is awakened as from a dream. It is as if one’s 
memory recalls something long forgotten. One realizes that what is 
obtained is one’s own and not from outside one’s self.”50
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Self as a Superordinate System
The self as a superordinate system is an abstract construct which 
is not experienced, but posited—much like the structure of the atom. 
It is at once a hypothetical center (and unity) and a total content of per­
sonality. It is not identified with or circumscribed by the conscious ego. 
In an ideal sense the self and the conscious ego hold one another in mutual 
regard. This superordinate system acts like an abstract universal within 
which operates the particular, the concrete and the unique aspects of self. 
Intellectually, it may be considered a transparent unity—or as a “hypo­
thetical summation of an indescribable totality.”51
51 Mysterium Coniunctionis, CW, Vol. XIV, par. 129, n. 66.
We are saying that the self expresses itself in five distinct ways. These 
aspects overlap in an interdependent complexity that is confusing without 
context. This context is the referential self, which I have designated as 
the superordinate system.
The figure of the bodhisattva also presents itself in Buddhist literature 
as a multidimensional expression. The seeming duplicity of the bodhisattva 
in all of his expressions is not duplicity at all when viewed from a certain 
vantage point. He is altrustic from one point of view and self-fulfilling 
from another. What is the general frame of reference within which the 
bodhisattva makes sense? One can say that this context is historical. At 
one time, he expresses himself one way, whereas at another time, he ex­
presses himself differently.
However, D.T. Suzuki is not content with this explanation. Suzuki, 
of all the scholars who write on the bodhisattva, presents the most esoteric 
picture. He would be the last to consider the condition of the bodhisattva 
to be a state of being that is once and for all achieved. This is so because 
there is nothing to achieve—there is only the way or process. Yet he uses 
the term “bodhisattvahood” to describe the condition within which the 
bodhisattva takes his various expressions. The term serves the same func­
tion as superordinate system.
The term “superordinate system” has the quality of a formal abstrac­
tion. It is the opposite of a personal framework. It serves as a neutral 
carrier. It is in this sense “empty.” It is that abstract form out of which rises 
the drama of self experienced as selves. In this context Edward Whitmont 
writes: “The Self as a predisposition which is ‘empty’ in itself actualizes 
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as representational images and as patterns of emotion and behavior.”52 
Suzuki writes of the self as “comparable to a circle which has no cir­
cumference, it is thus Sunyata, emptiness.”53 Here again is that aspect 
of self that is describable only as an extreme abstraction. Suzuki discusses 
Rinzai’s term for self: “the true man of no rank,” which is sometimes 
called the “Way-man.” He describes self as “... a kind of metaphysical 
self in opposition to the psychological or ethical self which belongs in a 
finite world of relativity. Rinzai’s man is defined as ‘of no rank* or ‘in­
dependent of* or ‘with no clothes on’.”54
52 Whitmont, Edward C., The Symbolic Quest (NY, 1969), p. 236.
53 Suzuki et al., Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis (NY, 1960), p. 25.
54 Ibid., p. 32.
55 Ibid., p. 70.
Later, in Suzuki’s description of the bodhisattva, he again calls upon 
Rinzai’s figure of the
man of no title: he is the one who is in the house and yet does not 
stay away from the road, he is the one who is on the road and yet 
does not stay away from the house. Is he an ordinary man or a great 
sage? No one can tell. Even the devil does not know where to locate 
him. Even the Buddha fails to manage him as he may desire. When we 
try to point him out, he is no more there, he is on the other side of the 
mountain.55
The bodhisattva, as a mystical figure, has the facility to carry an abstract 
form out of which emerges the expressions of a theme. He is that mytho­
logical format that is the occasion for the emergence of the hero, the man/ 
god, the promised self. He is a framework within which our expectations 
are made possible and meaningful. As a figure in literature, he offers the 
advantage of perspective. One can view him at a distance and therefore 
witness more clearly the dynamics of his drama. At the same time, I 
can know that he not only acts for me, but he is my most intimate nature.
In Jungian terms, the bodhisattva figure was not originally invented 
as a means to entertain us or to solve our awkward problems. To the 
extent that he captures our attention and imagination—to that extent he 
is native to our preconscious origin. He emerges as an overt expression 
of our covert questions. The occasion for his appearance and all his 
characteristics are created by our most private fears and hopes.
We respond to the heroics of the bodhisattva figure because we re­
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spond to our inner needs. Because of fear or ignorance, we are tempted 
to project all of this inner dynamic onto the outer drama. It is often more 
dramatic and always safer. The task of maturation or individuation is to 
recognize and own one’s projections; to allow one’s own inner image to 
emerge; to give a conscious form to that image so that it is neither in­
hibited nor preconditioned. 1 propose that the bodhisattva, as metaphor, 
is a valuable tool in that work.
T. W. Organ relates the following story from the Vedantic tradition: 
Ten men were once fording a swift river. Upon reaching the other 
shore, they counted themselves to see if all had arrived safely but 
alas... each man could count but nine men. A passerby, hearing 
their wailing over the loss of a comrade, counted the men and dis­
covered they were ten. He then asked each man to count, and when 
the counter counted but nine, the stranger touched him on the chest 
and said, “Thou art the tenth.”56
56 Organ, T. W.» The Self in Indian Philosophy (The Hague, 1964), p. 22.
I suggest that the passerby is the bodhisattva. He is not the self. As 
an historic figure, he stands for the conceptual model of self. As a meta­
phorical figure, he points to the experiential self. But as bodhisattva self, 
he is truly a passerby. He appears only to disappear, but not before he 
touches those of us who count and wail and informs us, “Thou art the 
tenth.”
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